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Although high-functioning autistic individuals demonstrate normative intelligence, profound 
deficits in social processing exist.  Understanding emotions in faces can be particularly 
difficult for autistic individuals.  In the present research a priming task was used to uncover 
the speed and strength of association between emotional faces and emotional words.  Autistic 
individuals are often capable of explicitly recognizing emotion in faces but still demonstrate 
difficulty interpreting emotional situations.  In the current study, emotional words were 
primed by quickly presented matching or mismatching emotional faces.  This may be more 
similar to naturalistic social interactions in which facial expressions change quickly.  The aim 
was to examine any differences in reaction times and error rates in the priming task between 
high-functioning autistic children and typical children.  Groups were divided into older (8-16 
years) and younger (7-11 years) groups to examine any developmental differences that might 
exist between the two groups.  Overall, no priming effects were seen across groups.  Younger 
typical children, however, did seem to be influenced by mismatching prime-target pairs.  
This may point to a differential developmental trajectory in face and emotion processing 
between autistic and typical children, as typical children were more influenced by face 
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Emotion Processing in High-Functioning Autistic Children: 
A Priming Task 
Autism is a developmental disorder marked by impairments in social interaction such 
as regulation of eye contact, recognition of facial expression, and a lack of social or 
emotional reciprocity (DSM-IV, APA, 2004).  The CDC‟s Autism and Developmental 
Disabilities Monitoring (ADDM) Network found that in 2007 as many as 1 in every 150 
children were affected with the disorder.  Between 1994 and 2006, the number of 6- to 17-
year-old children classified as having an autistic disorder in special education programs 
increased from 22,664 to 211,610, demonstrating the substantial prevalence of autism and 
need for research concerning the disorder (CDC, 2008).  Autism differs from other disorders 
in that its core deficit is in social interaction and this can be seen across the wide range of 
abilities found in the spectrum, from low-functioning autistic individuals to high-functioning, 
or Asperger‟s Syndrome (AS), individuals.  Early indices of Autism Spectrum Disorder 
(ASD) include deficits in social initiation, social approach, social smiling, social orienting, 
social imitation, shared attention, and response to social reinforcers (Dawson, 2008).  For 
those on the higher end of the spectrum, the only apparent deficit in functioning may be in 
their ability to empathize and socialize with others.  With no explicit cognitive or language 
delay proven to cause this social impairment, it is difficult to pinpoint the underlying 
mechanism that produces social dysfunction in autistic individuals.   
Impaired implicit processing of emotions in autistic individuals may provide evidence 
that underlying cognitive mechanisms are responsible for this overt social dysfunction.  
Specifically, understanding others‟ emotions by quickly reading their facial expressions and 
being able to associate that emotion with other concepts stored in semantic knowledge may 
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be hindered in autistic children, including high-functioning autistic children.  This 
impairment in quickly reading emotions may be more pronounced as the amount of available 
facial information decreases.  Autistic individuals particularly tend to avoid the eye region of 
the face, making emotion processing from the eye region particularly difficult for autistic 
individuals (Baron-Cohen, Jolliffe, Mortimore & Robertson, 1997; Baron-Cohen, 
Wheelwright, Hill, Raste & Plumb, 2001; Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, & Jolliffe, 1997; 
Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Spong, Scahill, & Lawson, 2001; Spezio, Adolphs, Hurley & 
Piven, 2007).  The impaired implicit processing of emotions seen in this group of individuals 
as compared to typically-developing individuals may provide clues as to the automaticity 
needed to read and understand others‟ emotions (Critchley et al., 2000; O‟Connor, Hamm & 
Kirk, 2007). Examining specific abnormalities in social processing of high-functioning 
autistic individuals may give insight into the root cause of social impairment that appears to 
afflict individuals at all levels of functioning on the autism spectrum. 
 High-functioning autistic (HFA) individuals as well as those diagnosed with 
Asperger‟s Syndrome (AS) and Pervasive Developmental Disorder Not-Otherwise-Specified 
(PDD-NOS) may appear functionally normative in everyday settings.  The disorder becomes 
apparent, though, in social settings where impairment is pronounced. High-functioning 
autistic individuals do not differ from typical individuals in terms of intelligence.  Autistic 
intelligence has been often overlooked and misinterpreted according to typical tests of 
intelligence such as the IQ test.  According to Dawson (2008), high-functioning autistic 
individuals often have normal or even above normal intelligence. In the past these individuals 
have been pejoratively labeled as “idiot savants,” implying that while they often excel in 
some areas, they lack greatly in others.  This is especially indicative of high-functioning 
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autistic or Asperger‟s Syndrome individuals who often display normative intelligence, but 
are profoundly socially impaired (Baron-Cohen, 2000).  Social dysfunction may be a deficit 
universal to the autism spectrum regardless of intelligence.  Why is it then that high-
functioning autistic adults and children can perform tasks with normative levels of 
intelligence, but display such abnormalities in when it comes to social functioning?  It may 
be that they are impaired in certain cognitive domains that facilitate this social understanding 
in typically-developing individuals.   
Theory of Mind and Social Functioning 
One of the main theories of interaction deficits in autism involves Theory of Mind 
(ToM), and proposes that social dysfunctions result from an inability to process and interpret 
mental states such as beliefs, desires, and emotions (Baron-Cohen, 2000).  Theory of Mind 
tasks that have frequently been found in the literature to be impaired in autistic individuals 
include first and second order false belief tasks, recognition and conceptualization of mental 
state words, and tests to infer complex mental states from facial features such as the eye or 
mouth region of the face (Baron-Cohen, 2001).  These are just a few of the many tasks that 
appear to be impaired in both autistic adults and children as compared to typically-
developing individuals. Baron-Cohen (1991b) found that autistic children did not achieve 
mastery of Theory of Mind tasks at the same age as typically-developing children and that 
autistic children often displayed a pattern of attainment of ToM tasks that varied from that of 
typically-developing children.  
In the Empathising-Systemising (E-S) theory of autism, Baron-Cohen (2000) referred 
to ToM as simply the cognitive aspect of empathy in relating to the social world.  In this 
approach, he listed a second component as necessary in social functioning, that of having an 
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appropriate response to an affective social situation.  It is here that autistic individuals may 
fall short.  They have the capacity to cognitively process incoming social information, but 
they may not have the ability to infer an appropriate social response. Correlations have been 
found between tests of ToM and empathic ability measures, such as recognition of emotional 
faces or conceptualization of emotional words (Buitelaar & van der Wees, 1997; Dyck, 
Ferguson, & Shochet, 2001). Social IQ, measured by tests of social situation interpretation 
and the WAIS Picture Arrangement subtest to measure perspective taking ability, has been 
found to be a mediating factor in emotion identification tasks (Teunisse & de Gelder, 2001).   
The fact that cognitive and affective components of social processing are related and 
impaired in autism may indicate that some underlying cognitive processing may produce 
such impairments in empathic ability.  Theory of Mind has been shown to be a specific social 
cognitive impairment in autistic individuals apart from other cognitive abilities (Baron-
Cohen, 1991a). When given tests of social cognition that do not involve attainment of ToM 
understanding such as relationship recognition, interpersonal reciprocity, and understanding 
of the animate-inanimate distinction, autistic children perform just as well as typically-
developing children (Baron-Cohen, 1991a).  Apart from other cognitive abilities, being able 
to understand specifically what is going on in another person‟s mind seems to be particularly 
difficult with autistic individuals.   
Explicit vs. Implicit Tests of Emotional Understanding 
While autistic individuals perform similarly to typical individuals in some cognitive 
tasks, differences between groups can be found in explicit versus implicit tests of emotion 
processing.  Tasks of social competence of autistic individuals often involve explicit 
instructions, such as matching emotional faces or words to other emotional faces or words, 
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and are usually performed with the same accuracy as typically-developing individuals 
(Humphreys, Minshew, Leonard & Behrmann, 2007).  Some researchers have argued that 
these tests of social functioning simply illustrate the ability of autistic individuals to develop 
compensatory strategies when asked to perform such explicit tasks, and that underlying 
deficits in social cognition are masked by use of these compensatory strategies (Grossman, 
Klin, Carter & Volkmar, 2000; Teunisse & de Gelder, 2001).  It is when these social 
cognitive tasks require that the participant have an intuitive understanding of the other 
person‟s internal mental state that autistic individuals demonstrate impaired performance.  
Compensatory strategies developed over time by high-functioning autistic individuals may 
mask actual implicit abilities of social functioning.  
These implicit deficits could be uncovered through the use of face and emotion 
processing tasks.  Autistic children show a different pattern of comprehension from typically-
developing children when interpreting facial cues. Child and adult studies, though, can 
provide very different findings and interpretations of results.  Many studies utilize various 
methodologies in which identification of emotions differs from matching of emotions.  
Emotion identification tasks require that participants look at a face and choose from a list of 
emotions the most appropriate answer (i.e., happy, sad, angry, etc.).  Emotion matching tasks, 
on the other hand, require that participants discriminate between two faces presented as to 
which face displays a particular emotion (e.g., “Which face looks angry?”).  In explicit tests 
of emotion identification and emotion matching tasks, autistic adults are able to match 
emotions with no difficulty, but show poor performance in comparison to typically-
developing participants when asked to identify emotions explicitly (Humphreys et al., 2007).   
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Autistic children, however, show a different pattern of results.  In a battery of face 
processing tasks, autistic children performed worse than verbal mental age-matched and 
chronological age-matched children, especially when asked to match emotional expression 
and eye gaze direction as seen in faces (Deruelle, Rondan, Gepner & Tardif, 2004; Riby, 
Doherty-Sneddon, & Bruce, 2008).  Riby, Doherty-Sneddon, and Bruce (2008) found 
emotional expression, lip-reading, and eye gaze direction identification tasks to be easier than 
matching tasks for autistic children.  For example, when asked to indicate which face was 
“happy” or “sad,” autistic children performed just as well as typical children.  When asked to 
indicate which face “feels the same way” as another face, however, autistic children‟s 
performance was impaired.  It seems that autistic children are explicitly able to recognize and 
identify emotion seen in faces.  When asked to match these concepts to other emotional faces 
or words, however, autistic children fail in comparison to typically-developing children 
(Deruelle et al., 2004; Riby et al., 2008).  On the surface this ability to recognize emotion is 
unimpaired, but implicit understanding may fall short when high-functioning autistic children 
must apply these concepts to other similar stimuli.   
These findings suggest that autistic adults may have had ample time over the years to 
establish conscious compensatory strategies in social situations, especially those involving 
emotional understanding.  Children may have not had the time or social training to be able to 
mask their social impairment.  O‟Connor, Hamm, and Kirk (2005) did not find any 
differences in emotion recognition abilities between autistic and typical children.  However, 
parent reports of autistic children indicated that these children were significantly more 
socially inept than their typically-developing counterparts.  O‟Connor et al. (2005) pointed 
out that this particular sample of autistic children had received social skills training that may 
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have contributed to their equivalent performance on the explicit emotion task but may not 
have helped with the children‟s overall social awareness.  In studying the effect of age on 
emotional comprehension strategies, Grossman, Klin, Carter and Volkmar (2000) divided 
their sample of high-functioning autistic children into a younger and older group. When high-
functioning autistic children were asked to explicitly name the emotion seen in a face that 
was simultaneously paired with either a matching (e.g., happy face/ “happy”) or mismatching 
label (e.g., happy face/ “sad”), younger autistic children made significantly more errors than 
typical controls when the emotional face was paired with a mismatched word.  Grossman et 
al. (2000) found that older AS children were less likely to be thrown off by a mismatched 
label.  These older children, then, may have had time to establish working compensatory 
strategies and use them in their everyday social functioning.  Compensatory strategies, 
whether acquired through specific social training programs or from years of experience in the 
social world, can have a confounding effect when determining the true capabilities of 
emotional understanding in autistic individuals.  Nonetheless their true capabilities may be 
distinguished in the high-functioning autistic individual‟s ability to interpret and categorize 
facial expressions in real time.   
Neurological/Biological Evidence for Impaired Face Processing 
In order to tease apart this potential confound of compensatory strategies used in 
social functioning, some researchers have employed the combined use of explicit and 
implicit measures in face perception. When autistic subjects are asked to perform explicit 
tasks in emotion recognition from faces, their performance is comparable to typically-
developing individuals. However, this may veil the differential brain activity that is occurring 
in performing explicit emotion recognition tasks.  While able to perform similarly to typical 
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subjects in an explicit emotion recognition task from both whole face and reduced features 
faces (such as faces with only eyes or mouth visible), O‟Connor, Hamm and Kirk (2007) 
found through ERP data that autistic subjects actually took longer to process this facial 
information.  This delay did not occur while processing objects.  MRI data has also revealed 
a differential pattern of brain activity in autistic individuals when implicitly processing 
emotional faces, but a normative pattern of brain activity when asked to perform an explicit 
emotion recognition task (Critchley et al., 2000). When high-functioning autistic adults were 
shown emotional faces they processed these faces differently when asked to consciously 
identify the specific emotion displayed than when they were asked to identify gender only.  
In this way, Critchley et al. (2000) showed that underlying brain functioning was different 
when consciously and unconsciously perceiving and interpreting affective faces.  Differential 
brain activation patterns according to MRI data have also been found in autistic individuals 
compared to typical subjects when asked to make judgments of both faces and objects 
(Schultz et al., 2000).  In face processing, autistic individuals tend to activate the inferior 
temporal gyrus, an area of the brain that is normally activated in typical subjects when 
processing objects, as opposed to the fusiform gyrus that is normally activated when viewing 
faces.  In this way, brain activation patterns suggest that autistic individuals tend to process 
faces more like objects.  Brain processing is even found to be different in autistic toddlers 
who do not show a varied brain activation pattern when viewing either their mother‟s or an 
unfamiliar person‟s face as compared to typically-developing children who do show 
differential brain activation (Dawson et al., 2002).  These autistic children did, however, 
demonstrate differential brain activation when viewing a favorite toy versus an unfamiliar 
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object.  The face, therefore, is not treated as a special category requiring special brain 
processing for autistic individuals as it might be for typically-developing persons.   
 Impaired/Unimpaired Implicit Understanding of Faces 
  Researchers have examined the interference and facilitation effects that emotional 
faces may have on other cognitive tasks.  In a variation on the basic Stroop task, Ashwin, 
Wheelwright, and Baron-Cohen (2006) laid colors over pictures of neutral or angry faces as 
well as over pictures of chairs.  They found that Asperger‟s individuals showed an attentional 
bias to pictures of faces rather than to non-social stimuli in that they took longer to name the 
color laid over these pictures than did typical subjects, but this delay in response latency was 
not found for pictures of chairs.  Perhaps faces, regardless of the specific emotion displayed, 
take longer to process for autistic individuals and therefore are harder to categorize according 
to affect. 
This implicit difficulty in emotional processing may not be so easy to recognize in 
high-functioning autistic individuals because these individuals are performing at normative 
levels with regards to simple face perception processing.  Contrary to initial evidence from 
Langdell (1978) and Hobson, Ouston, and Lee (1988), recently researchers have suggested 
that high-functioning autistic adolescents perform similarly to typically-developing 
adolescents on a face inversion task.  Specifically, Teunisse and de Gelder (2003) found that 
both autistic and typically-developing participants performed worse when asked to match one 
of two faces to a previously shown face when these faces were presented upside-down as 
opposed to right-side up.  They also did not find impairment in what they termed a 
“Composite Effect”. To demonstrate this, the researchers cut pictures of faces in half 
horizontally and skewed the bottom half either to the left or the right of the upper half, 
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altering the presentation of faces to participants with regards to their juxtaposition.  Teunisse 
and de Gelder (2003) found that autistic individuals were just as good at recognizing faces 
when given aligned and non-aligned upper and lower portions of faces.  Typically-
developing individuals, however, performed worse when given non-aligned faces compared 
to aligned faces.  Presentation of the whole face may not be as important in face processing 
for autistic individuals.  Instead Teunisse and de Gelder (2003) suggested a more feature-
based as opposed to configural-based search strategy may be employed by autistic 
individuals when viewing and interpreting affect in faces.   
Reduced Feature Face Processing 
High-functioning autistic individuals have been shown to perform nearly or just as 
well as typically-developing control subjects in correctly recognizing emotion when 
presented with a whole face stimuli (Adolphs, Sears, & Piven, 2001; Baron-Cohen, 
Wheelwright, Hill, Raste, & Plumb, 2001; Baron-Cohen, Jolliffe, Mortimore, & Robertson, 
1997; Critchley et al., 2000; Hobson, Ouston, & Lee, 1988; Langdell, 1978; Spezio, Adolphs, 
Hurley, & Piven, 2007, Lopez, Donnelly, Hadwin, & Leekam, 2004).  As available facial 
cues decrease, however, the ability to determine emotion becomes more difficult for autistic 
individuals.  This is demonstrated specifically when autistic subjects are given stimuli 
involving only the eye region of a face and asked to determine both basic and complex 
emotions (Baron-Cohen, Jolliffe, Mortimore, & Robertson, 1997; Baron-Cohen, 
Wheelwright, Hill, Raste, & Plumb, 2001; Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, & Jolliffe, 1997; 
Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Spong, Scahill, & Lawson, 2001; Spezio, Adolphs, Hurley, & 
Piven, 2007).  In comparison to controls, autistic subjects have an especially difficult time 
reading and interpreting emotion from the eyes.  Typical subjects rely on this information 
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from the eyes as indicators of specific affect during social situations, although this may not 
be the case for autistic individuals, who may show a particular avoidance from the eye region 
in processing faces. 
Some of the first research concerned with face processing in autism indicated a 
preference for the mouth region in autistic children.  Langdell (1978) found that autistic 
children were better able to recognize their peers when given features from the lower half of 
the face as opposed to typically-developing children who preferred to rely on features from 
the upper half of the face. Recently, through the use of visual scanpath data, Pelphrey et al. 
(2002) found that when autistic and typical participants were given pictures of emotional 
faces and asked to name the emotion, autistic participants tended to view nonfeature areas of 
the face significantly more often and core features areas of the face (i.e., eyes, nose, mouth) 
significantly less often than controls. Facial expressions are often complex and interpretation 
of them could vary depending on whether focus is placed on the mouth region, eye region, or 
some other area of the face.  This differential processing of facial features alone could 
account for some of the variability seen in overall emotion understanding in autistic children. 
Interpreting and Applying Emotion  
 Interesting findings arise when face processing involves both comprehension and 
application of related emotions to be used in social interactions.  It is here that autistic 
individuals may display implicit differences between themselves and typically-developing 
participants.  Autistic individuals may be able to recognize emotion as seen in faces, but may 
not be capable of correctly interpreting exactly what this emotion means during a social 
situation (Bolte & Poustka, 2003; Golan, Baron-Cohen, & Golan, 2008; Klin et al., 1999). 
Recently, Golan, Baron-Cohen, and Golan (2008) asked autistic and typically-developing 
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children to interpret and predict emotional reactions of actors to specific situations seen in a 
short film clip.  Participants were given background information from the scene leading up to 
the point where the actor was to respond to the situation in an affective manner.  Children 
were asked to indicate what they thought the actor would do or say next.  Autistic children, 
compared to typically-developing children, were impaired in this task, as it was difficult for 
them to interpret the next sequence of events that should occur. At the behavioral level, very 
young autistic children have also shown atypical responses to affective situations.  Sigman, 
Kasari, Kwon, and Yirmiya (1992) found that autistic toddlers looked significantly less at an 
adult showing negative affect than did typically-developing toddlers.  The autistic children 
played with a toy more and appeared less concerned about the adult‟s negative affect than did 
other children.  It appears that autistic children are aware of the existence of other people‟s 
reactions and emotions to certain situations, but have a difficult time understanding what that 
means in terms of social functioning.   
Theories of Emotion Activation and Association 
Autistic children may be able to recognize a social cue as emotional, but may not 
know how to use this information in a social context.  According to a categorical theory of 
relatedness that may be applied here to emotional understanding, pairs of items may prime 
each other due to their mutual semantic relationship (McNeill & Burton, 2002).  Bruce and 
Young (1986) established a theory of person recognition that involves, at the first level, Face 
Recognition Units (FRUs), that code a familiar person‟s face.  Next, Person Identity Nodes 
(PINs) recognize that person as familiar or unfamiliar, therefore representing the recognition 
of that person.  Finally, there is activation of Semantic Information Units (SIUs), which 
represent all categorical information related to that person.  It is in going from the Person 
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Identity Nodes to the Semantic Information Units, argued Bruce and Young (1986), that 
semantic categorization decisions and responses are made after activation of recognition of 
that person.   
As with person recognition, this model may be applicable to emotion recognition.  
Emotions must be perceived, recognized, and identified by a person for efficient social 
functioning. Within this framework, recognition of emotion must be able to activate other 
concepts stored in the semantic pool of knowledge to be associated with that particular 
emotion so that social responses made to the emotion are appropriate. Autistic individuals 
may be able to explicitly recognize emotion seen in facial affect, but be unable to then 
transfer this knowledge to activation of other associated concepts.  So even though this 
model pertains to person recognition, it is also relevant for emotion recognition and can 
provide a basis for abnormalities seen in face processing and emotion comprehension in 
autistic individuals, especially autistic children who have not yet developed social 
compensatory strategies.  The uneven profile of face perception skills seen in autistic 
children (Riby, Doherty-Sneddon, & Bruce, 2008) may lead to differential activation of 
semantic categorization, which would ultimately lead to misinterpretation of cues in the 
social environment and overall social impairment.   
The Present Research 
In the present research, I attempted to tap into the speed and strength of association of 
emotional facial cues and emotionally associated words through an affective priming task 
involving quick presentation of facial affect.  Affective priming tasks are designed to uncover 
the strength of automatic associations between two affective concepts stored in memory 
(Banaji & Hardin, 1996; Fazio, Sanbonmatsu, Powell, & Kardes, 1986). On a computer 
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participants are first shown a prime, consisting of either a word or picture, for a short time 
(1000 msec), are then shown a word or picture either related, unrelated, or neutral in valence 
(positive or negative) with the previously shown prime, and are then asked to categorize the 
target as positive or negative.  Reaction times in responding to the target word are dependent 
upon the target‟s associated strength with the prime.  Highly associated primes and targets 
should result in faster response latencies, whereas primes and targets with weak associations 
should produce slower response latencies (Meyer & Schvaneveldt, 1971).  This process of 
affective priming taps into the strength of association of related concepts and can give a 
relative indication as measured by reaction times as to the automaticity involved in the 
evaluation of those primes.  
To demonstrate the relative speed needed for interpretation of facial cues, an affective 
priming task was administered to both typically-developing children and high-functioning 
autistic children.  Primes consisted of emotional faces presented for one second and 
participants were asked to judge the positive/negative valence of target words following 
primes.  The ability to connect words on the basis of meaning through priming has been 
shown to be intact in autistic children relative to normal children (Hala, Pexman, & 
Glenwright, 2007; Lopez & Leekam, 2003; Toichi & Kamio, 2001), and semantic priming 
has been shown to be effective across picture-word modalities with autistic participants as 
well (Kamio &Toichi, 2000).  However, Lopez, Leekam, and Arts (2008) found a significant 
inverse correlation between face recognition in a semantic priming task and a semantically 
associated object categorization task in autistic children.  The autistic children in their study 
were either good at face recognition or semantic categorization of objects, but not both, 
15 
 
which may suggest that autistic children cannot integrate perceptual and categorical 
information into one semantic store. 
In the present research I attempted to demonstrate a deficit in face processing leading 
to impaired affective categorization of information in autistic children compared to typical 
children.  I examined both error rates and reaction times of matching and mismatching 
prime-target pairs.  Performance in the affective priming task was then examined relative to 
children‟s severity of autistic traits and social impairment. Those children who displayed 
more autistic traits and who were more socially impaired were expected to perform worse on 
the priming task overall.  For typically-developing children, emotional faces were expected 
to facilitate reaction times to matched emotional word targets and to inhibit reaction times to 
mismatched emotional word targets.  Since the current affective priming methodology 
involving facial feature primes and emotional target words has not been previously used with 
high-functioning autistic children, predictions of performance in this group were relatively 
speculative.  If reaction times of autistic children relative to typically-developing children 
were slower overall regardless of face type presentation, this would support either an overall 
deficit in face perception, or a deficit in affective association of concepts activated by 
emotional faces.  If autistic children performed just as well as typically-developing children 
with whole face presentation, but performed worse than typically-developing children when 
given eyes only or mouth only stimuli, then this pattern of results would suggest a particular 
deficit in feature-based recognition of emotions that leads to a deficit in activation of related 
concepts.  Neutral primes (presentation of a black box in place of an emotional face) 
provided a neutral condition that did not involve face processing. These predictions were 
further analyzed according to younger and older autistic and typically-developing children.  
16 
 
This was done to examine the presence of any age differences between the two groups and 
assess whether face processing follows a similar developmental trajectory between autistic 
and typical children. The hope with the present research was to highlight a specific 
developmental deficit in the ability to affectively associate and categorize emotionally-laden 
social cues in autistic children relative to typically-developing children and whether or not 
this varied with age.  Even though the literature has shown that autistic individuals are 
capable of explicitly recognizing emotion, they are still socially dysfunctional.  This 
dysfunction, therefore, may arise out of an inability to efficiently and quickly relate 
emotional faces to other concepts stored in memory, resulting in the overarching symptom of 




 Ten high-functioning children with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) ages 7 to 16 
were recruited from local schools, autism support groups, and parent associations in the 
Bellingham, Washington area.  Only those children diagnosed by a clinician as either High-
Functioning Autistic (HFA), Asperger‟s Syndrome (AS), or Pervasive Developmental 
Disorder Not-Otherwise-Specified (PDD-NOS) were included in the study.  Clinician 
diagnoses were confirmed via parent report.  Ten typically-developing children, matched on 
verbal, nonverbal, and composite IQ, as well as chronological age, acted as a control group 
and were recruited from the CLASP project participant pool at Western Washington 
University.  Participants‟ nonverbal, verbal, and composite IQ were measured according to 
the Kaufman Brief Intelligence Test Second Edition (K-BIT-2; Kaufman & Kaufman, 1997) 
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to ensure that both experimental and control groups were matched according to overall IQ.  
Autistic and typical children were categorized as younger if they were ages 7 to 11 and were 
categorized as older if they were ages 12 to 16.  Younger and older typical and autistic 
groups, therefore, consisted of 5 participants each.  
Materials 
Autism Spectrum Quotient 
 The AQ-Child (Auyeung, Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, & Allison 2007) is a 50-item 
parent-report questionnaire used to quantify autistic traits in children aged 4-11 years.  The 
Likert-type measure ranges in scores from 0-150, with higher scores indicating greater 
severity of autistic traits.  A score of 76 or above on the AQ-Child indicates a level of 
severity associated with both HFA and AS, with 95% of children diagnosed as HFA or AS 
scoring at or above this designated score. The AQ-Child has demonstrated good test-retest 
reliability (r = 0.85, p < 0.001), and high internal consistency ( = 0.97).  AQ-Adolescent 
Version (Baron-Cohen, Hoekstra, Knickmeyer, & Wheelwright, 2006) is similar to the AQ-
Child, but is used to indicate severity of autistic traits in adolescents aged 11-16 and has 
shown good test-retest reliability (r = 0.92, p < 0.001) and high internal consistency ( = 
0.79).  Scores on this measure range from 0-50.  This measure includes a cutoff score of 30 
or above to indicate severity of autistic traits. 
Social Responsiveness Scale 
 The Social Responsiveness Scale (SRS; Constantino et al., 2005) is a 65-item parent-
report questionnaire that measures the autistic child's social impairments according to social 
awareness, social information processing, capacity for reciprocal social communication, 
social anxiety/avoidance, and autistic preoccupations and traits ( = 0.80).  The scale is 
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appropriate for children aged 4-18, and includes a wide-range of severity of social 
impairment across the autism spectrum.  Higher scores on the SRS indicate a greater severity 
of social impairment.  Scores range from 0-120, with scores above 80 indicating severe social 
dysfunction associated with high-functioning autism. 
Stimuli 
 Face primes were obtained from Pictures of Facial Affect (POFA; Ekman, 1993) and 
the semantic priming stimuli set consisted of 36 different faces taken from this collection.  Of 
these, 12 different faces were included in each condition of the semantic priming task (6 
positive/6 negative whole face condition; 6 positive/6 negative eyes only condition; 6 
positive/6 negative mouth only condition).  A neutral stimulus consisting of a black rectangle 
in place of a face was also included 6 times per condition trial.  Eyes only and mouth only 
conditions were produced by removing all other core facial features from the picture so that 
only the target feature remained.  For example, the hair line, ears, and everything below the 
eyes were not included in eyes only pictures of faces (See Figure 1).  Positive faces included 
those that portray happiness, and negative faces included those that portray sadness.  Faces 
were chosen according to specific norms outlined in the POFA and included faces that were 
judged by at least 90% of raters as being happy or sad.  
 In addition to the 36 facial stimuli used in the semantic priming task, another 16 faces 
were chosen from the POFA stimulus set for use in an explicit emotion recognition task.  
Four different faces for each basic emotion of happiness, sadness, anger, and disgust were 




 Words used as targets during the semantic priming task included 18 items total, with 
9 positively associated (see Appendix A) and 9 negatively associated (see Appendix B) 
words randomly counterbalanced across trials, and were developed by the researcher and 
piloted prior to the present study.  All children included in the study were able to read these 
words.  
Procedure 
To accommodate parent and child comfort levels, participants either came into the lab 
for evaluation or a researcher visited them in their home. 
One parent of each child completed either the AQ-Child or AQ-Adolescent version, 
the Social Responsiveness Scale, and a demographics questionnaire. Next, a trained 
researcher conducted the K-BIT-2 IQ test in a quiet room away from distraction.   
 The semantic priming task involved a 2 x 3 x 2 design in which group (autistic vs. 
typical), prime face presentation (whole face, eyes only, mouth only), and prime-target 
valence (matching vs. mismatching) were counterbalanced between groups. Neutral primes 
(black rectangles) were included as a neutral control condition that did not involve faces to 
evaluate reaction times for primes that were not faces.  Six randomized experimental blocks 
were administered in which 18 trials of each condition (6 neutral, 12 whole face etc.) were 
presented.  Within these blocks, one third of the prime-target pairs were matching (e.g., 
happy face prime, positive target word), one third were mismatching (e.g., happy face prime, 
negative target word), and the remaining third consisted of equal numbers of positive and 
negative target words following neutral stimuli.  Equal numbers of positive and negative 
faces were presented.  The semantic priming task was administered on a laptop with Inquisit 
software (Inquisit, 2002).  Within each trial participants first see an orienting stimulus ( + ) 
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for 500 msec, then a prime face stimulus (either whole face, eyes only, mouth only, or a 
neutral black box) for 1000 msec, followed by a blank screen for 200 msec, and finally a 
target word (matching or mismatching) appears on the screen until a response is made (See 
Figure 2). Because face primes were presented for 1000 msec, which is above the threshold 
of conscious awareness, participants were instructed to simply look at the first picture, and 
only make judgments of the word that appeared next on the screen.  Studies involving autistic 
adult participants have included prime display times from as few as 600 msec (O‟Connor, 
Hamm, & Kirk, 2007) up to as many as 2000 msec (Toichi & Kamio, 2001).  In the present 
research I employed, in conjunction with similar research involving autistic children 
(O‟Connor, Hamm, & Kirk, 2005; Teunisse & de Gelder, 2001), a prime stimulus time of 
1000 msec to ensure that the prime information was perceived adequately by children, 
especially those who may have attention difficulties.  Participants who displayed difficulty 
maintaining focus or who displayed discomfort during the task as judged by the researcher 
completed only 3 blocks of trials as opposed to 6.  One younger autistic child and two 
younger typical children completed 3 blocks of trials as opposed to 6.  All other children 
completed 6 blocks of trials.   Participants were asked to indicate whether the following 
target word was positive or negative by pushing a button labeled with a smiling face for 
positive and a frowning face for negative on the keyboard.  No indications of incorrect 
responses were given to the subject throughout trials as this may have distracted from the 
task and could cause unnecessary frustration with the task that could interrupt reaction times.  
The inter-trial interval was 1 second.  To ensure that the task was understood, a practice 
block of 8 trials was conducted before experimental trials were run so that the child could 
become accustomed to the computer program and use of the keyboard.  All participants 
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indicated an understanding of the task after practice trials and continued on to experimental 
trials.  Error rates and reaction time (RT) measures only for correct responses were analyzed 
between groups and among conditions for the semantic priming task.   
 The last task involved an explicit forced-choice emotion recognition task.  This paper 
and pencil test included 16 additional faces taken from the POFA stimulus set.  Each page 
included one face displaying one of four emotions and participants were asked to choose 
from four choices provided (angry, sad, happy, disgusted) as to which emotion they believed 
the face was displaying. There was no time limit for this task and errors were scored.  This 
test was administered to ensure that each group explicitly understood basic emotional affect 
as seen in faces.  All participants provided informed parental consent and were debriefed at 
the conclusion of testing. 
Results 
Descriptive Data 
 Autistic and typically-developing children were matched according to chronological 
age, nonverbal IQ, verbal IQ, and composite IQ.  Autistic children scored significantly higher 
than typically-developing children on the Social Responsiveness Scale (SRS), indicating 
greater social impairment in this group of children, t (18) = 12.50, p < .001, d = 5.59. Autistic 
children‟s average scores on the SRS indicated a level of social impairment deemed 
profoundly socially impaired according to the measure, while typical children‟s scores 
indicated normative social functioning.  Autistic children also scored significantly higher on 
the Autism Spectrum Quotient (AQ) than typically-developing children, indicating a greater 
level of autistic traits, t (18) = 9.27, p < .001, d = 4.14.  Typical children‟s average scores for 
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this measure did not exceed the cutoff for autistic functioning.  See Table 1 for means and 
standard deviations of these measures.  
Reaction Time 
 Overall, no priming effects were found for either autistic or typically-developing 
children.  Face primes did not affect reaction time for the following target words.  Faces and 
target words matching in valence did not produce faster reaction times than mismatching 
prime-target pairs (See Figure 3).  (Initially, a Windsor method of calculating average 
reaction time scores was used, but this included a great number of outliers which added to 
overall variability.  Instead, median reaction time scores were used as an appropriate 
reflection of average reaction time.) 
A mixed-model ANOVA was conducted in which face presentation (eyes, mouth, or 
whole face) and prime-target match (matching vs. mismatching) were within-subjects factors, 
while group (autistic vs. typical) and age (younger vs. older) were between-subjects factors.  
The analysis revealed a main effect of age on reaction time such that older children 
responded faster than younger children, F (1, 16) = 10.82, p < .01, 2  = .40, MSE = 
6744783.75 (See Figure 3).  The ANOVA also revealed an interaction between face 
presentation and prime-target match, F (2, 32) = 3.80, p < .05, 2  = .19, MSE = 63748.43, 
and an interaction between face presentation, prime-target match, and age on reaction time, F 
(2, 32) = 3.37, p < .05, 2  = .17, MSE = 56501.18.  The 4-way interaction between face 
presentation, prime-target match, age, and group approached significance, F (2, 32) = 3.06, p 
= .06, 2  = .16, MSE = 51347.75.   
An additional ANOVA was conducted to look at differences between groups with 
regards to neutral prime conditions.  The ANOVA revealed a main effect of face presentation 
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on reaction time for neutral prime-target pairs, F (2, 32) = 4.06, p < .05, 2  = .20, MSE = 
295033.03.  There was no interaction between face presentation and group, F (2, 32) = 0.21, 
p = .81, no interaction between face presentation and age, F (2, 32) = 2.36, p = .11, and no 
interaction between face presentation, group, and age, F (2, 32) = 1.60, p = .22 (See Figure 
4).  When neutral primes were presented within blocks of trials involving whole face 
presentation reaction times were significantly slower than neutral primes presented in blocks 
of eyes and mouth only presentations, regardless of group and age.  It seems that trials 
involving whole faces took longer overall to process, whether it was a face or a neutral 
prime.  See Table 2 for means and standard deviations.  
 To further investigate the interactions, repeated measures ANOVAs (face 
presentation x prime-target match) were conducted within each of the four groups: older 
autistic, older typical, younger autistic, and younger typical children.  For older autistic 
children, younger autistic children, and older typical children there was no effect of face 
presentation, no effect of prime-target match, and no interaction between face presentation 
and prime-target match on reaction time. 
 For younger typical children, there was no effect of face presentation, F (2, 8) = 0.47, 
p = .64, and no effect of prime-target match on reaction time, F (2, 8) = 1.71, p = .26. The 
ANOVA did indicate, however, a significant interaction between face presentation and 
prime-target match, for younger typical children's reaction time, F (2, 8) = 4.57, p < .05, 2  = 
.53, MSE = 204396.63.  Younger typically-developing children took longer to react when 
eyes only prime-target pairs did not match.  They showed an opposite pattern, though, with 
mouth only trials.  When mouth prime-target pairs matched, younger typical children took a 
longer time to react than when mouth prime-target pairs were mismatched.  Mismatching eye 
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prime-target pairs seemed to produce some interference with regards to reaction time.  
Mismatching mouth prime-target pairs, though, seemed to produce some facilitation of 
reaction time scores. Thus the interactions indicate that only younger typically-developing 
children were influenced by the match between face primes and words (See Figure 5).   
Error Analysis 
 In terms of the priming task error data, ANOVA analyses did not reveal any effects of 
group, F (1, 16) = 0.74, p = .40, age, F (1, 16) = 1.38, p = .26, or an interaction between 
group and age, F (1, 16) = 1.03, p = .32, on error rates. 
 In terms of the explicit emotion recognition task error data, ANOVA analyses did not 
reveal any effects of autism, F (1, 16) = 0.10, p = .76, age, F (1, 16) = 0.39, p = .54, or an 
interaction between autism and age, F (1, 16) = 0.00, p = 1.0, on error rates. See Table 3 for 
error rates.   
Discussion 
 While both autistic and typically-developing children were matched in age and 
intelligence according to verbal, nonverbal, and composite IQ, the two groups differed in 
social functioning.  Autistic children were profoundly socially impaired according to the 
Social Responsiveness Scale, whereas typical children displayed social functioning in the 
normative range.  Autistic children also displayed greater severity of autistic traits according 
to the Autism Spectrum Quotient than typical children displayed.  The two groups, therefore, 
were matched according to age and IQ, but differed in that autistic children were clearly 
more socially impaired than typical children.  Any differences of scores in the priming task 
could then be attributed to group membership, either autistic or typical.  
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Overall though, no priming effects were found for either autistic or typical children 
regardless of age.  Matching prime-target pairs did not produce faster reaction times than 
mismatching prime-target pairs.  There was also no difference in error rates in the priming 
task between autistic and typical children. Error rates in the priming task were very low for 
every group, which may suggest that the task was too simple.  Also, the lack of reaction time 
and error rate findings could be the result of a prime duration that was simply too long.  
Banaji and Hardin (1996) have emphasized the importance of automaticity to facilitate 
associations between prime and target within a priming task.  A prime duration of one second 
is well above the threshold of conscious awareness, allowing ample time to process a prime 
and determine its relative usefulness to the task.  Within one second children may have been 
consciously able to process faces and then discard this information as useless when it came 
time to judge the target words.  Target words also remained on the screen until a response 
was made, allowing an unlimited time to process the words.  Perhaps if greater demands had 
been imposed on children while processing target words, there would have been a tradeoff in 
accuracy for speed.  For example, allowing children only 2 seconds to process the target 
word and make a subsequent judgment could have potentially produced differences in terms 
of error rates.   
 There was, however, an interaction between face presentation type and prime-target 
match that was apparent only for younger typically-developing children. Younger typically-
developing children seemed to have been affected by face primes when processing emotional 
target words, although they did so inefficiently.  It could be that at a young age typical 
children are attempting to cognitively associate emotional faces with other emotional 
concepts, but are not doing so efficiently.  As they develop, however, typical children may 
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use the face more efficiently, thereby diminishing any priming effects that may be evident at 
younger ages.  Both older typical and autistic children regardless of age may have ignored 
faces altogether.  Faces may not have been helpful to older typical children as they primed 
only 33% of trials.  Autistic children, on the other hand, may not have processed faces as 
useful or not, but rather ignored faces completely regardless of their priming appropriateness. 
There were no effects of prime-target match or face presentation for older typical children.  
Also, both groups of younger children displayed high variability in reaction times, but for the 
older typical children this variability decreased.  The same was not true for autistic children, 
who displayed large amounts of variability regardless of age.  Perhaps face processing 
becomes more stable over time for typical children, but remains an idiosyncratic process for 
autistic children regardless of age.  At older ages, face processing may become more 
automatic rather than effortful for typical children.  
Previously, researchers have explored the idea that autistic individuals may process 
emotion with the help of compensatory strategies learned over years through social programs 
and therapies (Grossman et al., 2000; Teunisse & de Gelder, 2001). This idea of 
compensatory strategies being used by autistic children was not fully supported in the current 
research.  Both younger and older autistic children demonstrated similar reaction time 
performances and error rates to typical children, and were not influenced by face primes or 
prime-target match.  It may be that rather than an inability to conceptualize and associate 
emotional faces and words, autistic children are simply not paying attention to faces to begin 
with, which would lead to the current lack of a priming effect seen in this group.  Autistic 
children may be ignoring faces and only processing words, while typical children are 
processing faces, deeming them useless, and then processing target words.  Both proposed 
27 
 
routes would lead groups to rely less on the influence of the face information when 
processing target words.   
Aversion to faces in autistic children may lead to an inability to quickly process 
emotion in faces (Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, & Jolliffe, 1997; Pelphrey et al., 2002; 
Sigman et al., 1992; Spezio et al., 2007).  Therefore, activation of other associated concepts 
in memory is simply not possible because no emotional concept is activated in the first place.  
Thus two cognitive routes may differentiate emotion processing in autistic and typical 
children.  Autistic children do not pay attention to faces and are unable to activate any other 
emotionally relevant information, leading to social responses that may be considered 
inappropriate.  Typical children, on the other hand follow a developmental trajectory of face 
processing in that early in life faces are effortfully used to infer emotion.  This process 
becomes more automatic with age so that faces are processed more quickly and efficiently. 
The present priming task may have also imposed demands which exceed the true 
capabilities of processing faces for autistic children in terms of speed and accuracy.  
O‟Connor, Hamm, and Kirk (2007) found through ERP data that autistic subjects took longer 
than typical subjects to process faces.  This delay did not occur while processing objects. 
Ashwin, Wheelwright, and Baron-Cohen (2006) also found that autistic individuals took 
longer to process emotion in faces as opposed to categorizing objects.  The current priming 
task presented primes for one second.  Future studies could vary this prime presentation time 
to examine the relative attention paid to faces by autistic children.  If autistic individuals 
simply take longer to process faces then priming effects might be seen when the prime 
presentation time is extended. Older typical individuals may process the face so quickly that 
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it becomes useless in terms of facilitating or inhibiting categorization of words, and therefore 
a priming effect may not be found with extended prime presentation times.  
Schultz et al. (2000) found that when viewing faces, autistic individuals tend to 
activate the area of the brain that is normally activated when viewing objects in typical 
individuals.  This suggests that autistic individuals process the face like an object.  It could be 
that autistic individuals take longer to process emotion in faces because they first activate the 
face like an object and then must process the stimuli as a face while extracting emotion from 
it.  In addition, autistic individuals may be using some other form of compensatory 
mechanism that does not rely on the face to make up for their inability to process emotion in 
faces.  This would support findings that autistic individuals take longer to process emotion in 
faces because they follow a different cognitive route than do typical individuals.  Future 
studies could incorporate objects as well as faces into an emotional priming task with varying 
prime presentation speeds to further delve into this speed of processing.  In addition, 
researchers could vary the usefulness of the primes with the idea that objects might be more 
useful to autistic individuals, whereas faces would be more useful to typical individuals in 
processing socially emotional targets.  Also, using emotional faces as primes as well as 
targets could be more useful and produce some facilitation or inhibition in a future priming 
task.  Similarly, differences between autistic and typical participants may be seen if objects 
are incorporated as primes and targets into a priming task.  Autistic individuals may be able 
to process objects more quickly, whereas typical individuals may be able to process faces 
more quickly.  Varying the prime presentation speeds of object and face primes could help to 
uncover how useful these stimuli are to each group.  In real life, facial expressions change 
rapidly, sometimes within hundredths of a second.  Varying prime presentation speeds would 
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be necessary to tap into this idea that face processing can become automatic over time.  This 
may be particularly relevant for typical children who may demonstrate a developmental 
trajectory of face processing.   
Flaws in the current research should be considered before designing another priming 
study using face primes and word targets.  The very small sample size of each of the four 
groups makes it difficult to interpret patterns in results and results should be treated with 
caution.  Future studies would benefit from having larger groups and by making a uniform 
diagnosis of autism within each group.  The current study included High-Functioning 
Autistic (HFA), Asperger‟s Syndrome (AS), and Pervasive Developmental Disorder Not-
Otherwise-Specified (PDD-NOS) children.  Although all three diagnoses fall under the 
Autism Spectrum, it is important to consider the individual characteristics of each that may 
influence results. As seen in Table 2, the small sample produced a large amount of variability 
in reaction times.  Concentrating on one diagnosis of either HFA, AS, or PDD-NOS may 
reduce the amount of variability in scores and lead to a different pattern of findings.  
In general, the priming task did not work, and therefore no differences between 
autistic and typical individuals can be accurately drawn.  Future researchers may consider 
varying prime duration and incorporating different prime stimuli to produce a priming effect.  
It is important though, to first establish an effective methodology for typical participants first, 
before administering such a task to autistic individuals.  If the priming task does not work in 
typical individuals, then administering it to special populations and drawing conclusions 
from any differences found between groups would be invalid.   
Although the current study‟s findings must be considered with caution, some 
conclusions can be inferred.  In conjunction with findings from O‟Connor, Hamm, and Kirk 
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(2005), I did not find any differences in explicit emotion recognition between autistic and 
typical children.  However, according to the SRS, autistic children are profoundly more 
socially impaired than their typical counterparts.  It could be that when asked to explicitly 
pay attention and name emotion in faces that autistic and typical children do not differ.  
However, in a priming task that quickly presents faces as primes it could be that autistic 
children simply choose not to pay attention to the face.  This may be done as a coping 
mechanism to combat any discomfort that emotional faces cause in autistic children.  Since 
they are not able to quickly and efficiently process faces they simply pay no attention to them 
at all.  This is not to suggest that autistic children are consciously choosing not to process 
faces, but rather that faces are inherently difficult and somewhat unimportant to the autistic 
individual‟s processing of his or her world.   
In general, it is of interest to note that younger typical children were affected by the 
face presentation and whether or not the face matched the target word.  This would imply 
some emotional activation and association of faces with other concepts in memory.  These 
effects were not seen at older ages in typical children, indicating some sort of developmental 
trajectory of face and emotion processing.  What is most interesting, however, is that no 
effects were seen across the board for autistic children, further supporting the idea that 
autistic individuals show a specific aversion from processing emotion in faces.  Future 
intervention and therapy research should as a first step consider the autistic child‟s aversion 
to faces.  Once attention is learned and regulated enough to be able to accurately perceive 
and recognize the face as emotional, then the autistic child can delve further into processing 
emotion.  This could potentially ameliorate some of the inappropriate social affect and 
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Descriptive data measures between older/younger typical/autistic participants 
 
Autistic    Typical 
 
Measure  Younger Older   Younger Older  
 
Chronological Age 8.76(1.06) 14.05(2.09)  8.80(0.83) 13.52(2.30) 
Verbal IQ  106.40(18.93) 113.20(18.51)  112.20(18.51) 109.20(24.28) 
Nonverbal IQ  106.60(21.23) 100.20(16.23)  106.80(24.04) 96.40(8.20) 
Composite IQ  107.40(22.94) 108.00(19.66)  111.00(22.17) 103.20(15.82) 
SRS Total*  119.20(26.24) 104.40(14.48)  10.60(7.09) 20.80(13.42) 
AQ Total*  100.20(14.75) 109.20(17.44)  34.80(19.89) 33.60(18.26) 
 















Reaction time data between older/younger typical/autistic participants 
 
Autistic    Typical 
Face Presentation/ 
Prime-Target Match  Younger Older     Younger           Older  
Match 
Eyes  1099.67(402.48)     923.86(826.82) 1194.92(222.39)     700.97(74.17) 
Mouth  1127.57(504.91)     683.45(301.86) 1211.99(378.41)     689.48(112.40) 
Whole  1089.93(300.51)     735.37(386.30) 1219.60(424.61)     662.58(71.87) 
Mismatch 
Eyes  1168.133(355.91)   726.73(319.03) 1218.73(251.38)     684.42(83.41) 
Mouth  1094.82(336.56)     685.50(278.82) 1000.55(238.99)     679.62(113.28) 
Whole  1195.00(532.37)     822.44(497.58) 1254.45(436.91)     683.30(90.57) 
Neutral 
Eyes  1024.10(333.68)     687.10(206.13) 1088.10(317.23)     648.60(53.09) 
Mouth  1024.50(298.03)     633.00(222.67) 1078.40(345.28)     677.70(99.03) 














Error data in percentages between older/younger typical/autistic participants 
 
      Autistic   Typical 
Type of Error  Younger Older  Younger Older  
 
Explicit Emotion 19%  16%  18%  15% 
Recognition     
 

































































































Young ASD Young TD Old ASD Old TD







































Younger Typical Children RT
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Appendix A 
Positive Words 
Great 
Love 
Lucky 
Joyful 
Sweet 
Wonderful 
Awesome 
Amazing 
Super 
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Appendix B 
Negative Words 
Rejected 
Depressed 
Terrible 
Miserable 
Shame 
Horrible 
Suffering 
Awful 
Sorrow 
 
 
